

Transport Layer Security (TLS1.3)

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A few words about me

- President: Industry Network Technology Council
- Founder & CEO: Inside Products, Inc.
- Advisory Board: India Internet Engineering Society
- RFCs: RFC8250 (Embedded performance and diagnostics for IPv6) and others
- Product developer (OEMed by IBM and others)
- Working with IPv6 for 15 years
- Working with network management, diagnostic, performance issues at large brick-and-mortar enterprises for over 30 years



Agenda

- Introduction
- TLS handshake (1.2 vs. 1.3)
- TLS 1.3 implications
- Interesting Internet Drafts
- Post-quantum implications

TLS1.3

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 8446

Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 6961

E. Rescorla

Mozilla

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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

Abstract

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

<https://www.iiesoc.in/>

<https://industry.netcouncil.org/>

TLS1.3: Important Features

- More of the handshake encrypted
- Improved performance
- Number of deprecations
- Future changes will be made to TLS1.3 only (most likely)

Computer Name Hardware Advanced System Protection Re

You must be logged on as an Administrator to make most of the

Performance

Visual effects, processor scheduling, memory usage, and virtu

User Profiles

Desktop settings related to your sign-in.

Startup and Recovery

System startup, system failure, and debugging information

User variables for nalin

| Variable | Value |
|------------------|---|
| OneDrive | C:\Users\nalin\OneDrive |
| OneDriveConsumer | C:\Users\nalin\OneDrive |
| Path | C:\Users\nalin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps;C:\Us... |
| TEMP | C:\Users\nalin\AppData\Local\Temp |
| TMP | C:\Users\nalin\AppData\Local\Temp |

Edit System Variable

Variable name: SSLKEYLOGFILE

Variable value: C:\naliniprograms\sslkeylog.txt

Browse Directory...

Browse File...

OK

Cancel

| | |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| SSLKEYLOGFILE | C:\naliniprograms\sslkeylogfile.txt |
| TEMP | C:\WINDOWS\TEMP |
| TMP | C:\WINDOWS\TEMP |
| USERNAME | SYSTEM |
| windir | C:\WINDOWS |

New...

Edit...

Delete

OK

Cancel

Let's get ready to trace. Set up environment variable for Wireshark.

SSLKEYLOGFILE

```
C:\naliniprograms\sslkeylog.txt - EditPlus
File Edit View Search Document Project Tools Browser ZC Window Help
1 CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET e52547119852337e5353b7880980d3f98604504bd964b838d952fee0c3c88262 1fff8127973495eae98fdc4b4409aa21f162fbaea70d0ce51108c16a5ebf05;
2 SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET e52547119852337e5353b7880980d3f98604504bd964b838d952fee0c3c88262 ea42b8e345f7b775fbf013dec1ba7a1156f122a789bd916b096d00c34da1d
3 CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 e52547119852337e5353b7880980d3f98604504bd964b838d952fee0c3c88262 452cafdeff2e4dbfed9878035cd7e80ade2f8314a65d5c522c91ad106e8b0392
4 SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 e52547119852337e5353b7880980d3f98604504bd964b838d952fee0c3c88262 8433a1ebfd17faa764c015a489d178fa35e4359a8ab2e572641b985ee876cd4c
5 EXPORTER_SECRET e52547119852337e5353b7880980d3f98604504bd964b838d952fee0c3c88262 1acc2f07101e33924ff1de62ab316f5b5c7fa679a62c0462a604f7d97cdc46e8
6 CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 2f88d1bd3cba222291637cbece9f035db5f6364c7671ce7eaac98bc9c514a969 301847b3324796bca0d06bec72a88c1b6ed9a2338b7cef9f5addca3c4ee70c
7 SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 2f88d1bd3cba222291637cbece9f035db5f6364c7671ce7eaac98bc9c514a969 3050ae666865850577b662fd4866283a3b3a5e2389696109380fc80df79a40f
8 CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET ee4eac74499a28378a8cacf0b6c907f1fb682e6687efb2ccbc218edd8846966f e8b2c54c151f6258e4cfa0cabeeaa55899266359bbf0f4fc6189c4974271998f
9 SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET ee4eac74499a28378a8cacf0b6c907f1fb682e6687efb2ccbc218edd8846966f 58e00edd44316c51f7c414838ac10d434b5524f5479d838419e52e93724596;
10 CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET b6b77ae058719f331f3979800fbcef3aed6311bf18d65e3a99a051bee10df1f9 34e72a1afa6789da070328c18b6ca08513c479c352f7333545bfd9731a6c2b;
11 SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET b6b77ae058719f331f3979800fbcef3aed6311bf18d65e3a99a051bee10df1f9 a2250efcdea29bf4962c59368bec1d1e935dec5d1e3d9789b564a2dd84cf69;
12 CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 2f88d1bd3cba222291637cbece9f035db5f6364c7671ce7eaac98bc9c514a969 0f3a81d356ab65870f9ba562d327620f0fc60d299d994af5e57523ac7c2b54d5
13 SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 2f88d1bd3cba222291637cbece9f035db5f6364c7671ce7eaac98bc9c514a969 4516e284b6b971674c445fa68a8e73d41bec6a6be6d99c1d0e830e568a4fb753
14 EXPORTER_SECRET 2f88d1bd3cba222291637cbece9f035db5f6364c7671ce7eaac98bc9c514a969 ec78cb333c6b177d5584a667d8f3c42a7941667eac68c010fa7845e9e15753f8
15 CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 ee4eac74499a28378a8cacf0b6c907f1fb682e6687efb2ccbc218edd8846966f 91929561f26f849236e57b6c978eb350a75cf90b45d70a623a2932ad7557986c
16 SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 ee4eac74499a28378a8cacf0b6c907f1fb682e6687efb2ccbc218edd8846966f c87e77fa0f9258d18a04961dd944b4a981d9ff3e2d10e411296ecf8facd5f1c7
17 EXPORTER_SECRET ee4eac74499a28378a8cacf0b6c907f1fb682e6687efb2ccbc218edd8846966f 9babf5f81956ee987fc658032d7f11ad2d4311eafca8ff874631371a36c4e8df
18 CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 b6b77ae058719f331f3979800fbcef3aed6311bf18d65e3a99a051bee10df1f9 bcdbe4182be04b63d4c17f50501bd78b28feea85f1dd77962cb3703bd9a5cf597
19 SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 b6b77ae058719f331f3979800fbcef3aed6311bf18d65e3a99a051bee10df1f9 61a1c4a42cb1394187bb6919d54e4b9b07caba14ae33ae29d2e01c8bec5dc854
20 EXPORTER_SECRET b6b77ae058719f331f3979800fbcef3aed6311bf18d65e3a99a051bee10df1f9 a3301b7d05bc24e9a66a7153bab7ddfafa6832ba7d0863183832ab3343a4fc1fc1
```

- Has the secrets for TLS1.x (1.0-1.3)
- File can get big!



- TETRA
- TFP
- TFTP
- Thread
- Thrift
- Tibia
- TIME
- TIPC
- TiVoConnect
- TLS**
- TNS
- Token-Ring
- TPCP
- TPKT
- TPLINK-SMA
- TPM2.0
- TPNCP
- TRANSUM
- TSDNS
- TSP



Transport Layer Security

RSA keys list

TLS debug file

- Reassemble TLS records spanning multiple TCP segments
- Reassemble TLS Application Data spanning multiple TLS records
- Message Authentication Code (MAC), ignore "mac failed"

Pre-Shared Key

(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename

Then, in Wireshark, use the Edit / Preferences selection panel to point to the SSLKEYLOGFILE in the environment variables. This will allow you to see the full handshake and to decrypt the packets.

OK

Cancel

Help

Let's do some traces!

The screenshot shows a Wireshark capture of a TLS handshake. The filter is set to `(tls.record.content_type == 22) && (ip.addr == 54.183.51.49)`. The packet list pane shows the following entries:

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Info |
|-----|----------|--------------|--------------|------------------|--|
| 60 | 0.327799 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | Client Hello |
| 64 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Server Hello |
| 68 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Certificate |
| 69 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Server Key Exchange |
| 70 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Server Hello Done |
| 72 | 0.353153 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message |
| 76 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | New Session Ticket |
| 77 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message |

The packet details pane for frame 60 shows the following structure:

- Frame 60: 571 bytes on wire (4568 bits), 571 bytes captured (4568 bits) on interface `\Device\NPF_{21B4E6F2-EDA8-40DB-9412-01229FD6D202}`, id 0
- Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_05:c3:0a (10:f0:05:05:c3:0a), Dst: ARRISGro_99:e3:d7 (10:56:11:99:e3:d7)
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.18, Dst: 54.183.51.49
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50229, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 517
- Transport Layer Security

- We can see TLS handshakes
- Are they TLS1.2 or TLS1.3?

*Wi-Fi

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

ip.addr == 54.183.51.49

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Info |
|-----|----------|-----------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| 60 | 0.327799 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | Client Hello |

Length: 512

- Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
 - Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
 - Length: 508
 - Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) ←
 - Random: af4ba5dbf1fb90c843a4b5074c52b06e5322e2b3e50d0a448faf6f54066c4a19
 - Session ID Length: 32
 - Session ID: 6d090c225ce255490a4257b2cfe42dacc39ee848c5780909e343a45ff7729b62
 - Cipher Suites Length: 32
 - Cipher Suites (16 suites)
 - Compression Methods Length: 1
 - Compression Methods (1 method)
 - Extensions Length: 403
 - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
 - Extension: compress_certificate (len=3)
 - Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=14)
 - Extension: server_name (len=27)
 - Extension: application_settings (len=5)
 - Extension: supported_versions (len=7)
 - Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
 - Extension: status_request (len=5)
 - Extension: session_ticket (len=0)
 - Extension: signature_algorithms (len=18)
 - Extension: psk_key_exchange_modes (len=2)
 - Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
 - Extension: supported_groups (len=10)
 - Extension: key_share (len=43)
 - Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)

It SAYS TLS1.2 but is it really?

We will have to look in the Client Hello and Server Hello Extensions.

```
*Wi-Fi
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tls.handshake.extensions.supported_version == 0x0304
No. Time Source Destination
60 0.327799 10.0.0.18 54.183.51.49
<
Session ID: 6d090c225ce255490a4257b2cfe42dacc39ee848c5780909e343a45ff7729f
Cipher Suites Length: 32
> Cipher Suites (16 suites)
Compression Methods Length: 1
> Compression Methods (1 method)
Extensions Length: 403
> Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
> Extension: compress_certificate (len=3)
> Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=14)
> Extension: server_name (len=27)
> Extension: application_settings (len=5)
v Extension: supported_versions (len=7) ←
  Type: supported_versions (43)
  Length: 7
  Supported Versions length: 6
  Supported Version: Reserved (GREASE) (0x3a3a)
  Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304)
  Supported Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
v Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
  Type: renegotiation_info (65281)
  Length: 1
  > Renegotiation Info extension
v Extension: status_request (len=5)
  Type: status_request (5)
  Length: 5
  Certificate Status Type: OCSP (1)
  Responder ID list Length: 0
  Request Extensions Length: 0
```

**Supported Versions
Client Hello Extension.**

**Says what versions are
supported by this
client.**



Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Source Port | Info |
|-----|----------|--------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|--------------|
| 64 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 | Server Hello |

```
> Frame 64: 167 bytes on wire (1336 bits), 167 bytes captured (1336 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{21B4E6...}
> Ethernet II, Src: ARRISGro_99:e3:d7 (10:56:11:99:e3:d7), Dst: IntelCor_05:c3:0a (10:f0:05:05:c3:0a)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 54.183.51.49, Dst: 10.0.0.18
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 443, Dst Port: 50229, Seq: 1, Ack: 518, Len: 113
```

```

Transport Layer Security
  TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
    Length: 108
  Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
    Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)
    Length: 104
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
    > Random: 0e6c9fbe2d2b68128518be86fbd28341f56a3085784d0e9f4dd882a90f6c2e05
    Session ID Length: 32
    Session ID: 526c8e55272ac350135a4836e190196751c1db070290fd8493c7124837fd3a8e
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
    Compression Method: null (0)
    Extensions Length: 32
    > Extension: server_name (len=0)
    > Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
    > Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
    > Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=5)
    > Extension: session_ticket (len=0)
    > Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
    [JA3S Fullstring: 771,49199,0-11-65281-16-35-23]
    [JA3S: bfc90d56141386ee83b56cda231ccccfc]
    
```



Supported Versions
Server Hello Extension
not there.

Handshake is TLS1.2.

Let's decrypt!

*Wi-Fi

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ip.addr == 54.183.51.49

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Info |
|-----|----------|--------------|--------------|------------------|--|
| 57 | 0.303778 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | 50229 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1 |
| 58 | 0.327473 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=26883 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=256 |
| 59 | 0.327561 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | 50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=131328 Len=0 |
| 60 | 0.327799 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | Client Hello |
| 63 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=0 |
| 64 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Server Hello |
| 65 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=114 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled P |
| 66 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=1574 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled |
| 67 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=3034 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled |
| 68 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Certificate |
| 69 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Server Key Exchange |
| 70 | 0.351517 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Server Hello Done |
| 71 | 0.351579 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | 50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=5437 Win=131328 Len=0 |
| 72 | 0.353153 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Finished |
| 73 | 0.353308 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | Magic, SETTINGS[0], WINDOW_UPDATE[0] |
| 74 | 0.353421 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | HEADERS[1]: GET /sync/v1?source_id=98KUz37ype9D3X2sf9ovgeTt&source_user_id=594901169 |
| 76 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | New Session Ticket |
| 77 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | Change Cipher Spec, Finished |
| 78 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | SETTINGS[0], WINDOW_UPDATE[0], SETTINGS[0] |
| 79 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | HEADERS[1]: 200 OK, DATA[1] |
| 80 | 0.373344 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | DATA[1] (PNG) |
| 81 | 0.373411 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | 50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1290 Ack=6024 Win=130560 Len=0 |
| 82 | 0.373667 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | SETTINGS[0] |
| 96 | 0.442181 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=6024 Ack=1328 Win=29184 Len=0 |
| 142 | 0.860613 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | HEADERS[3]: GET /universal/v1?supply_id=v5hJK9S1&gdpr=0&gdpr_consent= |
| 145 | 0.879657 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | 443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=6024 Ack=1428 Win=29184 Len=0 |
| 146 | 0.879657 | 54.183.51.49 | 10.0.0.18 | 50229 | HEADERS[3]: 302 Found |
| 155 | 0.923260 | 10.0.0.18 | 54.183.51.49 | 443 | 50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1428 Ack=6307 Win=130304 Len=0 |

- Full TLS1.2 handshake
- Can also see the packet payload because of SSLKEYLOGFILE

Let's look at another handshake

Wireshark capture of a TLS1.3 handshake. The capture is filtered for tcp.port == 50232. The handshake sequence is visible from packet 183 to 190.

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Source Port | Info |
|-----|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------|-------------|--|
| 183 | 1.172885 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 | Client Hello |
| 185 | 1.258203 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 | 443 → 50232 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=64128 Len=0 |
| 186 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 | Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec |
| 187 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 | 443 → 50232 [ACK] Seq=1351 Ack=518 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] |
| 188 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 | Encrypted Extensions, Certificate, Certificate Verify, Finished |
| 189 | 1.261944 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 | 50232 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=3262 Win=131328 Len=0 |
| 190 | 1.263263 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 | Change Cipher Spec, Finished |

- TLS1.3 handshake
- Can see the handshake because of SSLKEYLOGFILE
- Otherwise more of the handshake is encrypted.
- Let's look at next slide.

Same handshake w/out SSLKEYLOGFILE

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Info |
|-----|----------|---------------|---------------|------------------|--|
| 178 | 1.084046 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK |
| 181 | 1.172588 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 → 50232 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 |
| 182 | 1.172696 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=131328 Len=0 |
| 183 | 1.172885 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | Client Hello |
| 185 | 1.258203 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 → 50232 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=64128 Len=0 |
| 186 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec |
| 187 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 → 50232 [ACK] Seq=1351 Ack=518 Win=64128 Len=1460 [TCP s |
| 188 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | Application Data |
| 189 | 1.261944 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=3262 Win=131328 Len=0 |
| 190 | 1.263263 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | Change Cipher Spec, Application Data |
| 191 | 1.263413 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | Application Data |
| 192 | 1.263504 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | Application Data |
| 193 | 1.355043 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 → 50232 [ACK] Seq=3262 Ack=680 Win=64128 Len=0 |
| 194 | 1.355043 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | Application Data, Application Data |
| 195 | 1.355043 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | Application Data |
| 196 | 1.355141 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1221 Ack=4063 Win=130560 Len=0 |
| 197 | 1.355463 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | Application Data |
| 199 | 1.484290 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | 443 → 50232 [ACK] Seq=4063 Ack=1252 Win=64128 Len=0 |

- Notice only Client Hello and Server Hello are sent unencrypted.
- Application data packet before the 2nd Change Cipher Spec from the Client is handshake packet.
- Can't see Server Certificate

TLS1.3OrTLS1.2Trace.pcapng

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tcp.port == 50232

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Source Port | Info |
|-----|----------|-----------|---------------|------------------|-------------|--------------|
| 183 | 1.172885 | 10.0.0.18 | 15.235.42.103 | 443 | 50232 | Client Hello |

```

> Cipher Suites (16 suites)
  Compression Methods Length: 1
> Compression Methods (1 method)
  Extensions Length: 403
> Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
> Extension: supported_groups (len=10)
> Extension: server_name (len=16)
> Extension: signed_certificate_timestamp (len=0)
> Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=14)
> Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1)
> Extension: application_settings (len=5)
> Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
> Extension: signature_algorithms (len=18)
> Extension: session_ticket (len=0)
> Extension: psk_key_exchange_modes (len=2)
> Extension: key_share (len=43)
✓ Extension: supported_versions (len=7) ←
  Type: supported_versions (43)
  Length: 7
  Supported Versions length: 6
  Supported Version: Reserved (GREASE) (0x6a6a)
  Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304)
  Supported Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
> Extension: extended_master_secret (len=0)
> Extension: compress_certificate (len=3)
> Extension: status_request (len=5)
> Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)
> Extension: padding (len=204)

```

**Supported Versions
Client Hello Extension.**


**Says what versions are
supported by this
client.**



tcp.port == 50232

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Destination Port | Info |
|-----|----------|---------------|-------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| 186 | 1.261910 | 15.235.42.103 | 10.0.0.18 | 50232 | Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec |


```
Ethernet II, Src: ARRISGro_99:e3:d7 (10:56:11:99:e3:d7), Dst: IntelCor_05:c3:0a (10:f0:05:05:c3:0a)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 15.235.42.103, Dst: 10.0.0.18
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 443, Dst Port: 50232, Seq: 1, Ack: 518, Len: 1350
Transport Layer Security
  TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
    Length: 122
  Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
    Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)
    Length: 118
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
    Random: a738f2d313d3a3e95329f9eae86eac41354c8d5113d45d285489845886
    Session ID Length: 32
    Session ID: 91666aa46f9d5f36b32f4a622e66c28a96c19b3b3c73ecd09b6abf
    Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)
    Compression Method: null (0)
    Extensions Length: 46
  > Extension: key_share (len=36)
  > Extension: supported_versions (len=2)
    Type: supported_versions (43)
    Length: 2
    Supported Version: TLS 1.3 (0x0304)
    [JA3S Fullstring: 771,4865,51-43]
    [JA3S: eb1d94daa7e0344597e756a1fb6e7054]
```




Supported Versions
Server Hello Extension
is there.

Says that protocol
used is TLS1.3.

w/SSLKEYLOGFILE: Encrypted Extensions



The image shows a Wireshark capture of a network packet. The packet list pane shows a packet at time 1.261910 from source 15.235.42.103 to destination 10.0.0.18 on port 50232. The packet details pane shows the following structure:

- Frame 188: 505 bytes on wire (4040 bits), 505 bytes captured (4040 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{21B4E6F2-EDA8-400B-9412-01229FD6D202}, id 0
- Ethernet II, Src: ARRISGro_99:e3:d7 (10:56:11:99:e3:d7), Dst: IntelCor_05:c3:0a (10:f0:05:05:c3:0a)
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 15.235.42.103, Dst: 10.0.0.18
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 443, Dst Port: 50232, Seq: 2811, Ack: 518, Len: 451
- [3 Reassembled TCP Segments (3128 bytes): #186(1217), #187(1460), #188(451)]
- Transport Layer Security
 - TLsv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Multiple Handshake Messages
 - Opaque Type: Application Data (23)
 - Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
 - Length: 3123
 - [Content Type: Handshake (22)]
 - Handshake Protocol: Encrypted Extensions
 - Handshake Type: Encrypted Extensions (8)
 - Length: 11
 - Extensions Length: 9
 - Extension: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (len=5) ← 
 - Type: application_layer_protocol_negotiation (16)
 - Length: 5
 - ALPN Extension Length: 3
 - ALPN Protocol
 - ALPN string length: 2
 - ALPN Next Protocol: h2
 - Handshake Protocol: Certificate
 - Handshake Protocol: Certificate Verify
 - Handshake Protocol: Finished
 - Handshake Type: Finished (20)
 - Length: 32
 - Verify Data

Some Encrypted Extensions sent. It is the Application Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension.

Many extensions!

TLS Encrypted Client Hello

Although TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] encrypts most of the handshake, including the server certificate, there are several ways in which an on-path attacker can learn private information about the connection. The plaintext Server Name Indication (SNI) extension in ClientHello messages, which leaks the target domain for a given connection, is perhaps the most sensitive, unencrypted information in TLS 1.3.

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/>

Take 2 points
of view

Privacy
advocates

Large
“brick-and-m
ortar”
enterprises

What we
agree on ...



10,000 foot view of
encryption



Encryption is about
hiding things from the
bad guys

Where we
start to get
problems

Exactly who are
the bad guys?

What “stuff” are
we trying to hide?

How are we going
to do it?




**Take a one line
change**

Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.3: draft-02 :
Remove support for static RSA
and DH key exchange.

**But the
problem is
the reality of
enterprises
today**

Many enterprises use long term
private keys (RSA)



These are saved and provided to
out-of-band decryption devices /
software along with the packet
captures

Who are
these
“enterprises”

Fortune Global 500 list of 2019

| Rank ↕ | Company ↕ | Country ↕ | Industry ↕ | Revenue in USD ↕ |
|--------|--------------------------|--|-------------|------------------|
| 1 | Walmart |  United States | Retail | \$514 billion |
| 2 | Sinopec Group |  China | Petroleum | \$415 billion |
| 3 | Royal Dutch Shell |  Netherlands | Petroleum | \$397 billion |
| 4 | China National Petroleum |  China | Petroleum | \$393 billion |
| 5 | State Grid |  China | Energy | \$387 billion |
| 6 | Saudi Aramco |  Saudi Arabia | Energy | \$356 billion |
| 7 | BP |  United Kingdom | Petroleum | \$304 billion |
| 8 | Exxon Mobil |  United States | Petroleum | \$290 billion |
| 9 | Volkswagen |  Germany | Automobiles | \$278 billion |
| 10 | Toyota Motor |  Japan | Automobiles | \$273 billion |

Also
includes...



Health care insurance in
the US



Government (federal,
regional, local)



Schools, hospitals, etc


How do they
solve
problems?

Packet decryption

DoD and Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI)

How do enterprises do DPI today?

Many enterprises use long term private keys (RSA)



These are saved and provided to out-of-band decryption devices / software along with the packet captures

Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS1.2

- This document deprecates the use of RSA key exchange and Diffie Hellman over a finite field in TLS 1.2, and discourages the use of static elliptic curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites.
- Note that these prescriptions apply only to TLS 1.2 since TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996] and TLS 1.3 either does not use the affected algorithm or does not share the relevant configuration options.
- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex/>

Freeze TLS1.2

Abstract

TLS 1.2 is in widespread use and can be configured such that it provides good security properties. TLS 1.3 is also in widespread use and fixes some known deficiencies with TLS 1.2, such as removing error-prone cryptographic primitives and encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders.

Both versions have several extension points, so items like new cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. This document specifies that TLS 1.2 is frozen: no new algorithms or extensions will be approved.

Further, TLS 1.3 use is widespread, and new protocols should require and assume its existence.

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen/>

Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS1.3

- Hybrid key exchange refers to using multiple key exchange algorithms simultaneously and combining the result with the goal of providing security even if all but one of the component algorithms is broken.
- It is motivated by transition to post-quantum cryptography. This document provides a construction for hybrid key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3.

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/>

Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (pquip)

[About](#)[Documents](#)[Meetings](#)[History](#)[Photos](#)[Email expansions](#)[List archive](#)

Document 

Date

Active Internet-Draft (1 hit)

[draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-00](#)

13 pages [2023-](#)

Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes

Related Internet-Draft (1 hit)

[draft-driscoll-pqt-hybrid-terminology-02](#)

13 pages 2023-

Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes

Terminology for Post Quantum

One aspect of the transition to post-quantum algorithms in cryptographic protocols is the development of hybrid schemes that incorporate both post-quantum and traditional asymmetric algorithms. This document defines terminology for such schemes. It is intended to be used as a reference and, hopefully, to ensure consistency and clarity across different protocols, standards, and organisations.

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology/>

Changes for Post Quantum

- Need cipher suites
- Need TLS changes (key exchange)
- Need certificate / signing changes
- Need implementation in crypto libraries (OpenSSL, etc)
- Need changes to compilers (Java, C++, etc)
- Need changes to web servers (Apache), data base servers, etc.
- Need to change application programs

Questions?

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