Transport Layer Security (TLS1.3)

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A few words about me

- President: Industry Network Technology Council
- Founder & CEO: Inside Products, Inc.
- Advisory Board: India Internet Engineering Society
- RFCs: RFC8250 (Embedded performance and diagnostics for IPv6) and others
- Product developer (OEMed by IBM and others)
- Working with IPv6 for 15 years
- Working with network management, diagnostic, performance issues at large brick-and-mortar enterprises for over 30 years

Agenda

- Introduction
- TLS handshake (1.2 vs. 1.3)
- TLS 1.3 implications
- Interesting Internet Drafts
- Post-quantum implications

TLS1.3

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 8446

Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 6961

E. Rescorla

Mozilla

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The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

Abstract

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.

TLS1.3: Important Features

- More of the handshake encrypted
- Improved performance
- Number of deprecations
- Future changes will be made to TLS1.3 only (most likely)



Let's get ready to trace. Set up environment variable for Wireshark.

SSLKEYLOGFILE



- Has the secrets for TLS1.x (1.0-1.3)
- File can get big!


Wireshark · Preferences
TETRA
TFP
TFTP
Thread
Thrift
Tibia
TIME
TIPC
TiVoConnect
TLS
TNS
Token-Ring
TPCP
TPKT
TPLINK-SMA
TPM2.0
TPNCP
TRANSUM
TSDNS
TSP
Transport Layer Security
RSA keys list
Edit...
TLS debug file
Browse...
Reassemble TLS records spanning multiple TCP segments
Reassemble TLS Application Data spanning multiple TLS records
Message Authentication Code (MAC), ignore "mac failed"
Pre-Shared Key
(Pre)-Master-Secret log filename
C:\nalini\programs\sslkeylog.txt
Browse...
Then, in Wireshark, use the Edit / Preferences selection panel to point to the SSLKEYLOGFILE in the environment variables. This will allow you to see the full handshake and to decrypt the packets.
OK
Cancel
Help

Let’s do some traces!



- We can see TLS handshakes
- Are they TLS1.2 or TLS1.3?



It SAYS TLS1.2 but is it really?

We will have to look in the Client Hello and Server Hello Extensions.



Supported Versions Client Hello Extension.

Says what versions are supported by this client.



Supported Versions Server Hello Extensio not there.

Handshake is TLS1.2.

Let’s decrypt!



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Destination Port	Info
57	0.303778	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	50229 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
58	0.327473	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=26883 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 WS=256
59	0.327561	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=131328 Len=0
60	0.327799	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	Client Hello
63	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=0
64	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	Server Hello
65	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=114 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled P
66	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=1574 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled
67	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=3034 Ack=518 Win=28160 Len=1460 [TCP segment of a reassembled
68	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	Certificate
69	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	Server Key Exchange
70	0.351517	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	Server Hello Done
71	0.351579	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=5437 Win=131328 Len=0
72	0.353153	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
73	0.353308	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	Magic, SETTINGS[0], WINDOW_UPDATE[0]
74	0.353421	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	HEADERS[1]: GET /sync/v1?source_id=98KUz37ype9D3X2sf9ovgeTt&source_user_id=594901169
76	0.373344	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	New Session Ticket
77	0.373344	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
78	0.373344	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	SETTINGS[0], WINDOW_UPDATE[0], SETTINGS[0]
79	0.373344	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	HEADERS[1]: 200 OK, DATA[1]
80	0.373344	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	DATA[1] (PNG)
81	0.373411	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1290 Ack=6024 Win=130560 Len=0
82	0.373667	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	SETTINGS[0]
96	0.442181	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=6024 Ack=1328 Win=29184 Len=0
142	0.860613	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	HEADERS[3]: GET /universal/v1?supply_id=v5hJK9Sl&gdpr=0&gdpr_consent=
145	0.879657	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	443 → 50229 [ACK] Seq=6024 Ack=1428 Win=29184 Len=0
146	0.879657	54.183.51.49	10.0.0.18	50229	HEADERS[3]: 302 Found
155	0.923260	10.0.0.18	54.183.51.49	443	50229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1428 Ack=6307 Win=130304 Len=0

- Full TLS1.2 handshake
- Can also see the packet payload because of SSLKEYLOGFILE

Let’s look at another handshake



- TLS1.3 handshake
- Can see the handshake because of SSLKEYLOGFILE
- Otherwise more of the handshake is encrypted.
- Let’s look at next slide.

Same handshake w/out SSLKEYLOGFILE



- Notice only Client Hello and Server Hello are sent unencrypted.
- Application data packet before the 2nd Change Cipher Spec from the Client is handshake packet.
- Can't see Server Certificate



Supported Versions Client Hello Extension.

Says what versions are supported by this client.



Supported Versions Server Hello Extension is there.

Says that protocol used is TLS1.3.

w/SSLKEYLOGFILE: Encrypted Extensions



Some Encrypted Extensions sent. It is the Application Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension.

Many extensions!

TLS Encrypted Client Hello

Although TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] encrypts most of the handshake, including the server certificate, there are several ways in which an on-path attacker can learn private information about the connection. The plaintext Server Name Indication (SNI) extension in ClientHello messages, which leaks the target domain for a given connection, is perhaps the most sensitive, unencrypted information in TLS 1.3.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/

Take 2 points of view

Privacy advocates

Large "brick-and-mortar" enterprises

What we agree on …

10,000 foot view of encryption

Encryption is about hiding things from the bad guys

Where we start to get problems

Exactly who are the bad guys?

What “stuff” are we trying to hide?

How are we going to do it?

Take a one line change

Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3: draft-02 : Remove support for static RSA and DH key exchange.

But the problem is the reality of enterprises today

Many enterprises use long term private keys (RSA)

These are saved and provided to out-of-band decryption devices / software along with the packet captures

Who are these "enterprises"

Fortune Global 500 list of 2019

Rank	Company	Country	Industry	Revenue in USD
1	Walmart	United States	Retail	$514 billion
2	Sinopec Group	China	Petroleum	$415 billion
3	Royal Dutch Shell	Netherlands	Petroleum	$397 billion
4	China National Petroleum	China	Petroleum	$393 billion
5	State Grid	China	Energy	$387 billion
6	Saudi Aramco	Saudi Arabia	Energy	$356 billion
7	BP	United Kingdom	Petroleum	$304 billion
8	Exxon Mobil	United States	Petroleum	$290 billion
9	Volkswagen	Germany	Automobiles	$278 billion
10	Toyota Motor	Japan	Automobiles	$273 billion

Also includes…

Health care insurance in the US

Government (federal, regional, local)

Schools, hospitals, etc

How do they solve problems?

Packet decryption

DoD and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)

How do enterprises do DPI today?

Many enterprises use long term private keys (RSA)

These are saved and provided to out-of-band decryption devices / software along with the packet captures

Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS1.2

- This document deprecates the use of RSA key exchange and Diffie Hellman over a finite field in TLS 1.2, and discourages the use of static elliptic curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites.
- Note that these prescriptions apply only to TLS 1.2 since TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996] and TLS 1.3 either does not use the affected algorithm or does not share the relevant configuration options.

- **https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex/**

Freeze TLS1.2

Abstract

TLS 1.2 is in widespread use and can be configured such that it provides good security properties. TLS 1.3 is also in widespread use and fixes some known deficiencies with TLS 1.2, such as removing error-prone cryptographic primitives and encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by outsiders.

Both versions have several extension points, so items like new cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. This document specifies that TLS 1.2 is frozen: no new algorithms or extensions will be approved.

Further, TLS 1.3 use is widespread, and new protocols should require and assume its existence.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rsalz-tls-tls12-frozen/

Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS1.3

- Hybrid key exchange refers to using multiple key exchange algorithms simultaneously and combining the result with the goal of providing security even if all but one of the component algorithms is broken.
- It is motivated by transition to post-quantum cryptography. This document provides a construction for hybrid key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/

Datatracker Groups Documents Meetings Other User

Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (pquip)

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

Document	Date
Active Internet-Draft (1 hit)	
draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-00 **Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes**	13 pages 2023-
Related Internet-Draft (1 hit)	
draft-driscoll-pqt-hybrid-terminology-02 **Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes**	13 pages 2023-

Terminology for Post Quantum

One aspect of the transition to post-quantum algorithms in cryptographic protocols is the development of hybrid schemes that incorporate both post-quantum and traditional asymmetric algorithms. This document defines terminology for such schemes. It is intended to be used as a reference and, hopefully, to ensure consistency and clarity across different protocols, standards, and organisations.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology/

Changes for Post Quantum

- Need cipher suites
- Need TLS changes (key exchange)
- Need certificate / signing changes
- Need implementation in crypto libraries (OpenSSL, etc)
- Need changes to compilers (Java, C++, etc)
- Need changes to web servers (Apache), data base servers, etc.
- Need to change application programs

Questions?

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